Legal Services and the Emergence of a Service Economy: Practical and Theoretical Considerations by Self, Richard
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 7 Issue 1 
1985 
Legal Services and the Emergence of a Service Economy: 
Practical and Theoretical Considerations 
Richard Self 
Office of the United States Trade Representative 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Transnational Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Self, Legal Services and the Emergence of a Service Economy: Practical and Theoretical 
Considerations, 7 MICH. J. INT'L L. 269 (1985). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol7/iss1/15 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Legal Services and the Emergence
of a Service Economy: Practical and
Theoretical Considerations
Richard Self*
Lawyers spend a great deal of critical time regulating themselves-establish-
ing meaningful standards for entry into their profession and drawing up
disciplinary actions to insure proper behavior. As "officers of the court," attor-
neys have always been driven by particularly strong motivations to live by princi-
ples of the highest order. However, the inherent complexities of the legal
profession inevitably result in complex regulations, and those who administer
them are not easily driven to change. As regulators, they have profound reasons
for establishing certain limitations on entry into the profession, oftentimes as a
consequence of unfortunate experiences.
Perhaps the most difficult question facing legal professional associations is
how to treat outsiders, particularly attorneys from foreign countries. The issue
has become more acute as the growth of international trade and investment has
led attorneys, following their clients, to attempt to establish themselves perma-
nently in foreign legal jurisdictions. In fact, over the past three years the problem
of transnational legal practice has, at least between the United States and Japan,
become a trade issue in its own right. As U.S. lawyers attempt to tear down
Japanese barriers against foreign legal "consultants," foreign attorneys in the
United States struggle against similar obstacles in the District of Columbia,
Illinois, and California.
Recently, those in the United States concerned with trade negotiations have
emphasized the problems of U.S. service industries in foreign markets. We have
discovered that lawyers as well as accountants, architects, and engineers face
serious problems in doing business abroad. Most of these problems relate to
professional certification or, as in the case of Japan, to the ability of foreign
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attorneys to consult on matters relating to foreign and international law. Although
those who establish and maintain professional standards have little sympathy for
the view that theirjudgments should be questioned by trade specialists, principles
of trade are nevertheless becoming relevant to these heretofore sacrosanct rules
because many of them are simply protectionist. They serve essentially one func-
tion-to deny foreigners the opportunity to engage in a profession for which they
are totally qualified.
While professional certification standards may never be subordinated entirely
to trade principles, outside scrutiny cannot be avoided so long as such standards
are unreasonably burdensome and restrictive. In some instances, trade institu-
tions may be the only forum for bringing out the restrictive nature of a rule that is
viewed by its perpetrators as inherently sovereign. The evolution of the services
economy, including the professional services, has brought such restrictive prac-
tices into sharper focus, and it is useful to review recent developments in U.S.
trade policy that are responsive to these new issues.
I. UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY FOR SERVICES
In 1974, Congress authorized the President to include service transactions in
the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. I Little was known about the problems
affecting the service sectors and U.S. trade officials readily concluded that it
would be impossible to negotiate understandings for services other than those
related to the entry of merchandise into customs. At the conclusion of the Tokyo
Round, however, U.S. service industries began making a plausible case that trade
in "invisibles" would be enhanced by the same principles of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 that govern trade in goods.
At the time, a number of changes in the U.S. economy pointed to the emerging
service sectors as the most promising areas for future growth. Having always
possessed a strong service economy, the United States capitalized on the infor-
mation revolution and peculiar adjustments in post-war demographics and the
growth of two-income households to generate service industries that went beyond
the span of economic prediction. New data transmission technologies enabled
services to be provided on a larger, more ambitious scale. Architecture and
design plans were beamed off satellites to remote areas of the world where major
construction projects were launched by U.S. firms. Financial transactions, rang-
1. The original authority to enter into agreements with foreign countries to reduce barriers to trade
in services is included in section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1982
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1982)). This authority is limited to nontariff barriers to
trade in services and expires on January 2, 1988. 19 U.S.C. §§2112(b), (g)(3).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1977, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. The GATT has been modified in several respects since 1947.
The current version is reprinted in 4 CONTRACTING PARTIES TO GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969).
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ing from bank fund transfers to complex credit analyses, made Wall Street the
mecca for world finance. An aging population generated an explosion of new
leisure time activities and an enormous growth in health care services. The
dramatic change in the role of women in the economy generated numerous
service activities from day-care centers to time-saving habits of food consump-"
tion. The new competition generated by the deregulation of the airline, trucking,
securities, and banking sectors also spurred service sector growth.
Today, three of every four jobs in the United States' non-agricultural work
force are in service industries, 3 and the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that
in the next ten years, these sectors will account for nine of every ten new jobs.
4
Services currently make up approximately 63 percent of U.S. gross national
product. 5 While the statistics inadequately measure our services exports, one
estimate placed the U.S. share at $60 billion in 1980.6 Recent technological
developments and the evolution of many U.S. corporations into multinationals
has given further momentum to the search for new service markets abroad. The
service sectors have, in many instances, become the engine of growth for goods
producing sectors whose ability to compete abroad has been enhanced by infor-
mation technologies, transportation, and financial systems that make a commer-
cial difference. Another important trend has been the proclivity of large
multinationals to spin off their legal, advertising, and accounting departments,
permitting them to operate as separate entities, serving a variety of customers.
None of this would be possible without recent developments in communication
and analysis that enable professional services of varying sizes to compete in the
global marketplace.
Significantly, during the services "boom" of the 1970s, U.S. services exports
are estimated to have increased by no more than 18 percent in proportion to goods
exports. 7 In 1980, the United States Trade Representative submitted to the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 8 an illustrative list
3. ECONOMIC CONSULTING SERVICES INC., THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF U.S. SERVICE
INDUSTRIES: CURRENT DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 3 (1981) (prepared for the U.S. Depart-
ment of State and the U.S. Trade Representative).
4. Personick, A Second Look at Industry Output and Employment Trends Through 1995, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Nov. 1985, at 26.
5. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 69
table 6.1 (July 1984). The table covers the years 1980 through 1983.
6. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. NATIONAL STUDY ON TRADE IN SERVICES:
A SUBMISSION BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE 117 (1984).
7. Id. at 60.
8. The OECD is composed of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, the Irish Republic, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, TUrkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Yugoslavia is a member with special status.
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of 250 barriers to services exports experienced by U.S. firms. 9 By 1985, the list
included over 500 barriers. 10 Thus while those at the Tokyo Round were not ready
for service sector negotiations, the frustration of the service industries was grow-
ing.
In 1982 trade in services became the principal issue at the GATT Ministerial
where, for the first time, the issue was presented formally as one that deserved
attention under GATT rules. Most countries, including many from the indus-
trialized world, reacted with the same indifference that U.S. trade negotiators had
in 1975. Developing countries, led by Brazil and India, maintained, as they do
today, that the GATT is not a document capable of dealing with transactions that
do not physically enter customs. Since that time, most of the principle trading
nations of the GATT have analyzed the role of services in their national econo-
mies and have considered seriously the prospect of establishing disciplines based
on GATT principles to liberalize trade in these sectors. Nearly all of the members
of the OECD favor negotiations on services in the next GATT trade round. A
number of important developing countries share this goal though the issue con-
tinues to be characterized as a North-South affair, and some developing countries
remain skeptical, fearing a colonization of their service sectors by large U.S.
firms that will inhibit the development of their national service sectors. Nonethe-
less, the progress of the last four years in getting countries to understand service
sector problems, and in determining how these problems may be made subject to
binding international rules, has been dramatic. In November 1985, at its annual
meeting, the GATT contracting parties established a preparatory committee
whose agenda includes the development of services issues as a topic for future
negotiations. Services trade negotiations are indeed inevitable.
II. UNITED STATES NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES
Many challenges face those who will draw up trade rules covering services.
The most immediate of these is whether to establish understandings on a sector-
by-sector basis or to create an encompassing set of general principles. Admit-
tedly no set of general rules could begin to cover every issue peculiar to every
sector in every country; however, a few principles may be adopted that would
work toward liberalization in all sectors. The United States has proposed a
conceptual framework of such rules, most of which are borrowed from the
GATT, through which it will seek parallel sector understandings that deal indi-
vidually with the unique problems faced by each service industry.
9. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SELECTED EXAMPLES OF SERVICES TRADE
BARRIERS (1981) (submission to the OECD) (copy on file, U.S. Trade Representative).
10. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, AN ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF U.S. SERVICES
INDUSTRIES PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN MARKETS (1985) (submission to the GAlT') (copy on file, U.S.
Trade Representative).
SERVICE ECONOMY 273
The proposed U.S. framework is based on six principles intended to ensure (1)
transparency, (2) national treatment, (3) due process, (4) most-favored nation
treatment, (5) establishment of rules governing public monopolies, and (6) estab-
lishment of procedures for consultation and dispute settlement. Each of these is
crucial to successful sector understandings. Transparency would obligate coun-
tries to notify the GATT of any restrictive national practices that are inconsistent
with sector understandings. A fundamental regulatory practice for many service
sectors in the United States, national treatment would require that all participants
treat foreign entities no less favorably then domestic concerns. In a highly regu-
lated environment, a due process principle assuring public comment by all inter-
ested parties prior to the introduction of a regulation is absolutely critical. Most
favored nation treatment will assure that the balance of rights and concessions
will be extended only to countries willing to live by the agreed upon rules. Many
important service sectors, including telecommunications and airlines, are owned
by governments. While it is unrealistic to expect that the special area of activity
reserved to monopolies could be thrown open to competition, the behavior of
monopolies in related commercial activities, such as data processing and airline
reservation systems, should be subject to certain rules. Finally, the conceptual
framework must be contractually binding, allowing countries to redress the bal-
ance of concessions they have obtained under it. Consultation and dispute settle-
ment procedures identical to those of the GATT would fulfill this obligation.
Individual sector agreements would serve as annotations to the framework,
incorporating the agreed upon principles but dealing with additional issues criti-
cal to a particular sector. For example, rules governing the treatment of foreigners
by associations administering professional standards might be included in such
annotations.
There is the strong belief within the United States Government that it is critical
to have at least a handful of major sector understandings in addition to the
framework in order to achieve a genuine reduction of barriers to trade in services.
Although the government has not yet set priorities as to which sectors should be
addressed, the Services Policy Advisory Committee, a group of senior corporate
executives who advise the United States Trade Representative on services trade
policy, has recommended that information services be the first to receive atten-
tion. Much will depend on the consensus emerging from the parties to a services
negotiation.
A second challenge lies in determining whether the GATT legal instrument
should itself be amended to cover services. While there are differing opinions as
to whether the GATT articles could, as a matter of law, cover the service sectors,
the articles themselves are sufficiently vague that, absent clarification, they will
require a formal amendment process to ensure that services fall under the GATT
rules. Amending the GATT, which requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds of
the contracting parties, would appear to be an impossible task in view of the
continued opposition of many developing countries to the services initiative. A
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more realistic alternative would be the adoption of an understanding similar to the
GATT Code on Government Procurement," which while it does not track spe-
cific GATT articles, is administered by the GATT Secretariat and does contain
elements of the GATT that ensure that it is a legally binding document. This is a
likely alternative as the agreement would apply only to those countries who
signed it and individual sectoral annexes could reflect the differing interests and
regulatory sensitivities of subscriber countries.
Another challenge to the negotiation of a services understanding is the excep-
tions and derogations that will undoubtedly arise as a result of domestic regula-
tions that do not conform to its provisions. In some countries subnational entities
are charged with regulating certain services and the federal or central government
cannot, given the constitutional sovereignty of those entities, commit them to
international understandings. Such a situation in the United States and Canada
poses a major challenge to the governments of those countries. This problem is
also reflected in the OECD Code on Invisibles Transaction, 2 which is burdened
with an inordinate list of exceptions and derogations that have rendered the Code
relatively impotent.
If a GATT understanding is to improve on the relatively uninspiring results of
the OECD Code, it must be structured to recognize the long term process of
services liberalization. It cannot become an overly ambitious document that fails
to take account of regulatory reality. One approach would require each party to
notify the other signatories, through the transparency provision, of those prac-
tices that are inconsistent with any of the principles of the understanding. Pro-
vided the country notifies at the outset of any exercise, such provisions would not
be subject to the rights and obligations enjoyed under the arrangement. Practices
not notified but found inconsistent with the principles of the understanding would
be subject to consultation and dispute settlement, and eventual retaliation. Any
laws or regulations adopted after the effective date of the agreement would be
bound automatically by the terms of the agreement.
These procedures would first achieve a standstill on new laws or regulations
restricting the entry of foreign service providers and second make the notification
process a meaningful one because of the incentive to effectively grandfather
regulatory provisions. The inventory of notified rules under the transparency
requirement would provide the basis for the next stage of negotiations. Provided
there are staged sequences of trade negotiations dealing with the plethora of
restrictive regulations governing services, the arrangement would have credibility
as a device for systematically reducing barriers to trade in services. Because
developing countries tend to have more regulations that would require notifica-
II. GATT, Agreement on Government Procurement, T.A.I.S. No. 10403,-U.N.T.S.-.
12. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Code of Liberalisation of Current
Invisible Operations (1982).
SERVICE ECONOMY 275
tion, the understanding, to a certain degree, must contain provisions for special,
differential treatment that many of these countries seek.
III. THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Professionals face numerous problems in doing business abroad. The most
common difficulties involve burdensome immigration rules that prohibit free
movement across borders and the inability to obtain necessary professional cer-
tification. The method chosen to deal with these problems will depend on the
level of presence that professionals and professional firms wish to attain in a
foreign country. In the most liberal and most desirable environment, an indi-
vidual or firm would enjoy complete rights as a foreign corporate citizen. Profes-
sional certification examinations administered to foreigners would involve
requirements no more burdensome than those applied to nationals. Foreign attor-
neys would be allowed to practice all forms of law and foreign accountants would
be authorized to sign audits.
In an environment less open to international trade in services, foreign profes-
sionals could serve only as consultants or advisors. It is this type of presence
currently sought by U.S. lawyers in Japan. Under such arrangements, foreign
legal consultants are generally authorized to advise only on foreign and interna-
tional law. Accountants and architects generally may provide appropriate as-
sistance to the individuals responsible for a particular audit, or to the foreign
architects responsible for the integrity of building design. This is the most com-
mon form of presence because it does not involve resident immigration rules-
the product of a socio-political process to which trade principles are generally
subordinated. The presence of foreign consultants with the expertise necessary to
provide a particular service breeds joint ventures, although the local partners or
associates of course remain the people legally capable of fulfilling domestic
regulatory requirements.
A third type of presence involves only the use of a foreign firm's name. In such
situations, all of the work is carried out by nationals. This type of presence can be
of considerable importance to multinationals looking for a reliable firm to per-
form a service that must be carried out locally. The presumption is that a foreign
firm exercises its reputable professional judgment in lending its name to local
enterprises whose offices are staffed strictly by nationals.
Can an international body such as the GATT have an effect on the delicate
process of enabling foreigners to establish one of these types of presences? It
would be unrealistic to assume that an international referee could overturn the
sovereign standards set by professional regulatory bodies. Nonetheless, countries
might obligate themselves to a process whereby foreign citizens would have the
opportunity to become certified to enter a given profession by meeting a special
set of requirements imposed by that profession's regulatory body. Such a process
is being developed by the American Board of Certified Architects, which ana-
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lyzes carefully the background and education of applicants and draws up specific
supplementary educational requirements before administering a certification ex-
amination. The architects are working toward a system of case-by-case qualifica-
tion with the objective of providing as many foreign citizens as possible with an
opportunity to be certified. In the District of Columbia, a foreign citizen with a
legal education grounded in Anglican common law can be admitted to practice
law after one year at a U.S. law school and completion of the bar examination.
Each of these procedures avoids some of the more overt protectionist profes-
sional standards, such as the requirement of national citizenship or graduation
from a particular university. They nonetheless will not overcome certain rigidly
established forms of protection such as the absolute quota the Japanese place on
those who can take the bar exam, not to mention the additional quota on those
who are permitted to pass the exam. (No legal jurisdiction in the United States
prohibits foreign citizens from taking the bar exam.) International leadership is
needed to pressure those in control of professional certification systems to re-
move requirements that bear no reasonable relationship to standards of profes-
sionalism. A set of international guidelines, while not adjudicatory, could
provide a basis for countries to redress the balance of concessions they are
entitled to under a services understanding.
The role of national professional services regulators may be inherently sov-
ereign, but when that role defies reason, it will be transformed into a trade issue.
